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Resumen: En este artículo se reconstruye la teoría de las categorías de 
Peirce y se muestra que la forma canónica de las categorías que él propone 
es Primeridad, Segundidad, Terceridad. También se discuten las categorías 
cosmológicas relacionadas de Tijismo, Sinequismo y Agapismo eviden-
ciando y discutiendo algunos problemas. En particular, se discute en qué 
sentido se puede hablar de categorías últimas o básicas, las diferentes for-
mas de relaciones, los diferentes tipos de causas, el principio de adquisición 
de hábitos, la posible evolución de las leyes y el papel de la representación 
en nuestra relación con la realidad.
Palabras clave: Categorías, Primeridad, Segundidad, Terceridad, Tijis-
mo, Sinejismo, Agapismo, Causa.
Abstract: Peirce’s theory of categorization is reconstructed and shown 
that the canonical form of the categories proposed by him are Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness. The related categories of Tychism, Synechism and 
Agapism are also discussed and shown several problems. In particular, I 
discuss about the sense in which we can speak of ultimate and basic cat-
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egories, the different forms of relations, the different kinds of causes, the 
principle of habit-forming, the possible evolution of laws, the role of rep-
resentation in our dealing with reality.
Keywords: Categories, Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, Tychism, Syn-
echism, Agapism, Cause.
§1. COLLECTING A VAST MATERIAL
Peirce has dealt along his whole life with the problem of categorization. His 
production shows several changes and shifts but also an impressive continuity 
not only in the general characters of the research but also in some fundamental 
results. We can schematically depict five different periods. Let us first summarize 
his contribution and then consider some problems1.
1.1 First period
A first period (going from 1861 up to 1884) precedes the formulation of 
the categories Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Here, he already speculated about 
categories, initially about the notion of IT (Peirce, 1861a). He shows already 
a tendency towards triadic categorization, what raises some doubts about his 
later statement (Peirce, 1898: 124; Peirce, 1898: 146) that he learnt about this 
triadic structure from Kant, since a first mention of this philosopher appears in 
the 1865 Harvard lectures (Peirce, 1865, W 1.164). We may assume that Peirce 
dealt intensively with Kant when preparing these lectures but that his engage-
ment with transcendental philosophy was very embryonic before. In fact, the 
first categories proposed by him where “I, It, and Thou” (which do not possess a 
Kantian flavor and are rather influenced by romantic poets). Too little is known 
for making some conjectures (the manuscript is a kind of table of contents of 
an unwritten book). In a second short manuscript (Peirce, 1861b), he speaks of 
three celestial worlds, a reminiscence of which can be found in his later saying 
1 I am very thankful to Dr. J. Santiago Pons Doménech for his careful reading of the text and the 
many suggestions.
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about the law (of mind) that is “the celestial and living harmony” (Peirce, 1892b, 
W 8.154): they are the manifold of sense, the world of consciousness, the world 
of abstraction. The first notion can be mapped to that of “It” while the second 
to that of “I”. However, it is difficult to find a connection between the world 
of abstraction and whatever of the former three categories. Nevertheless, there 
is also some connection since at the end of these brief notes it is said that “time 
becomes space by conjunction with a heavenly world”, “that of consciousness. 
And this turns the IT to THOU”. It may be noted that this second triad seems 
somehow connected with an act of faith, what reinforces the conjecture that 
Peirce’s original reflection on categories was not so Kantian.
Apparently, the influence of Kant is clearer when he came later on these issues 
in his 1866 Lowell lectures (already anticipated in a kind of preparation man-
uscript of 1865). in particular in the ninth one. Here, it is formulated again a 
triadic articulation of categories that will remain plus or minus stable across the 
years and that is even somehow acknowledged later on (Cfr. Peirce, 1898: 150): 
he speaks about a reference to a Ground, reference to a Correlate, and reference 
to an Interpretant. Peirce tells us here (Peirce, W 1.473-75) that reference to a 
ground is Quality, which means “the pure form or abstraction which is the origi-
nal of the thing and of which the concrete thing is only the incarnation” (thus, we 
find here somehow the world of abstraction); if we ask about the occasion upon 
which the conception of quality was introduced, we find that was when “gener-
alization and contrast takes place, that is when things are put into comparison” 
(what bears a connection with the manifold of senses). and this makes the refer-
ence to a correlate; if we finally ask about the occasion upon which reference to a 
correlate was introduced, it appears that “it is the reference of things to a mediating 
representation or interpretant”2. While relation is of two kinds (equiparance and 
disquiparance). there are three kinds of representation: likeness (what is called 
icon later on). indication or correspondence to a fact (index). and symbol (see 
also Peirce, W 2.56). In the same lecture (Peirce, W 1.485) these three aspects 
are connected with hypothesis, induction and deduction, respectively. We see 
here the very first idea of semiotics that takes its origins from the issue of catego-
rization. Vice versa, it may be noted that the representational view of semiotics 
2 My italics: this has a connection with the world of consciousness.
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strongly influences (and will influence) his work on categorization. About the 
latter, we can easily find in the three kinds of reference discussed in these lectures 
the basic features of the later categories.
These ideas are extensively developed in the 1868 published paper “On a 
New List of Categories” (Peirce, 1868b). Here it is said that the word IT stands 
for substance or “what is present in general”, while being denotes simply “an 
indefinite determinability of the predicate”. “Substance is inapplicable to a pred-
icate, and being is equally so to a subject” (Peirce, W 2.49-50). Now, expressing 
more clearly hints already present in the Lowell lectures, Peirce says that the three 
references are kinds of “intermediate between the manifold of the substance and 
the unity of being” (where it is likely that there is a connection with the previous 
world of abstraction). “The conception of being is to unite the quality to the 
substance” (Peirce, W 2.51-52). In the Lowell lectures (Peirce, W 1.473). Peirce 
had introduced the notions of dissociation (when we think of an object without 
thinking to the other at the same time). abstraction or prescission (when we sup-
pose an object to be without the other). and discrimination (when we recognize 
that the two things are not the same). Now (Peirce, W 2.53-54). he tells us that 
“reference to a ground cannot be prescinded from being, but being can be pre-
scinded from it”; “reference to a correlate cannot be prescinded from reference 
to a ground; but reference to a ground may be prescinded from reference to a 
correlate”; “reference to an interpretant cannot be prescinded from reference to 
a correlate; but the latter can be prescinded from the former”. In the same paper 
(Peirce, W 2.55) he calls for the first time the interpretant a third. Summarizing, 
it is clear that Peirce dealt with these basic notions in terms of possible referenc-
es or also possible relations (monadic, dyadic, triadic). establishing in this way 
a hierarchy among categories, from the more basic one (the first) to the more 
complex one (the latter). a feature that will remain a constant across his whole 
intellectual production.
Between 1865 and 1871 Peirce was mainly interested in logic, categories and 
semiotics. Thereafter, he dealt much more with the problem of reality and in 
what is likely the first manuscript on that subject (Peirce, 1872-1873, W 3.28-
32) he formulated also his idea of pragmatism: from 1872 onwards we have the 
formulation of pragmatism essentially connected to belief and inference, so that 
reality becomes convergence of belief in our intercourse with objects. In this 
period (Peirce, 1872-1873, W 3.63) in continuity with his early representation-
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al understanding of semiotics, he develops also the idea that “an idea is in the 
strictest sense a representation”, and in this way he believed to solve the problem 
of reference (Peirce, W 3.64): “There must be connected with any representation 
of an object another representation which represents that object independently 
& there must be a representation that the one represents whatever the other rep-
resents”. I mention that first hints of this approach can already be found in 1865 
(Peirce, W 1.322 ff.).
1.2 Second period
Peirce seems to have come back to the issue of categorization only in 1885 
(starting the second period of his thinking on this subject). when, after an in-
tensive and productive work on logic, he writes the “Notes on the Categories” 
(Peirce, 1885a). After a reference to Kant’s list of categories, which are “no longer 
believed in” (Peirce, W 5. 235) and having said that there is a triadic structure in 
all Kantian formal logic, he introduces them as First, Second Third, and adds the 
idea (Peirce, W 5.236-37) that “three conceptions are really essential in formal 
logic; so that they are three fundamental categories of thought”. This is in agree-
ment with the previous connections of categorization with a theory of relations 
since Peirce has always considered the latter a logical issue (see e.g. Peirce, 1898, 
third lecture). However, Peirce seems to think here also about a general ontolog-
ical sense of the categories, since he speaks of three faculties of the mind, three 
functions of the nerves, and three elementary constituents of the physical uni-
verse, so that they seem to have a ground in the physical or rather metaphysical 
constitution of our universe, what goes certainly much further than a Kantian 
approach to categorization. This will also remain a constant in his work. The 
category of the First is presented as something unrelated to whatever “in itself; 
something without genesis, flourishing in spontaneous and pristine freedom”. It 
is worth stressing that Peirce’s evaluation of a fundamental aspect of freedom and 
chance in our universe is something really new relative to the classical thought 
(both in physics and philosophy) and anticipates somehow developments of the 
20th century in quantum mechanics. The category of the Second is a “real re-
lation to something, a clash, a constraint, a force, an end”, while the Third is 
“medium; representation; synthesis (and analysis); resultant; absorption, evolu-
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tion”; or also: “The Third is the medium between the first and the second, the 
beginning and the end. It is what actually is, while the First and the Second are 
merely its limits” (Peirce, W 5.238-39). It is important to note that Peirce never 
abandoned the idea that the Third is mediation between the first two categories, 
although later accounts of categories show some inconsistencies on this point. 
It is in fact worth noticing that both the Second and the Third are presented 
as dynamical categories. In another interesting manuscript of this period about 
“One, Two, Three” (Peirce, 1885b). it is evident that relations play a central role 
in categorization, since One expresses singular characters, Two dual characters, 
and Three plural characters. In fact, in the same manuscript it is shown that any 
kind of higher-order plurality can be reduced to a triadic relation (a preferred 
example of Peirce is a network of roads).
However, the formal aspects are a part of the issue, since Peirce adds that, due 
to their absolute generality, these categories “must be innate ideas” (Peirce, W 
5.245). It is also remarkable that Peirce relates the three categories to conscious-
ness, and therefore to experience, and in particular to (1) feeling, (2) conscious-
ness of an interruption or sense of resistance, and (3) synthetic consciousness 
binding time together (Peirce, W 5. 246). It is then not surprising that later, in 
a manuscript (1886a) that could be considered a kind of first Guess at the Rid-
dle, he speaks explicitly of Kantian categories. However, as mentioned, there is 
here a kind of tension between the ontological widening of the categories and 
their presumed Kantian character, whether of logical or experiential kind. In the 
quoted manuscript of 1885, he introduces the idea that physical constants (and 
so also laws of nature) could have undergone some kind of evolution, so that the 
universe is “progressing from a state of all but pure chance to a state of all but 
complete determination by law (Peirce, W 5.293). It is thus not surprising that in 
this manuscript he also speaks of an Evolutionist speculation. Nevertheless, the 
state of complete determination by law appears to be not fully in agreement with 
the idea that Secondness, which, also according to later contributions, should 
represent the final stage of the universe but also expresses clash and reaction. I 
think that the source of the problem is in the mentioned fact of having assigned 
dynamical character to both Secondness and Thirdness.
One year after he starts to write what is up to now one of the most complete 
accounts of what can be called Peirce’s canonical categories: Guess at the Riddle 
(1887-1888). At the start (Peirce, W 6.168) he says: 
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The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like that 
of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long 
time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school 
and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociol-
ogy, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as the filling 
up of its details.
It is again evident that the project goes again much further than being a 
theory of experience or a logical examination. The First expresses ultimate facts 
that are “not capable of explanation” (Peirce, W 6.205-206), so that “conformity 
to law exists only within a limited range of events” and “is not perfect” (Peirce, 
W 6.207). The dynamical character of the Third is formulated more explicitly 
than before: “Between the beginning as first, and the end as last, comes the 
process which leads from first to last” (Peirce, W 6.173). I also recall that God is 
understood here as the First as Creator and the Absolute Second as completely 
revealed, while “every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the 
third” (Peirce, W 6.173-74). Also in the related manuscript titled “Thrichoto-
mic” (1888) he says that genuine Secondness is of dynamical kind (Peirce, W 
6.211) but tells again that Thirdness is a process (Peirce, W 6.214). Since the pri-
mordial state of matter is conceived (following H. Spencer) as homogeneity, then 
it is added that variety (which should be the First) is only potential (Peirce, W 
6.181). In a previous manuscript on “Design and Chance” (Peirce, 1883-1884, 
W 4.550), it is said that “chance must act to move things in the long run from 
a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity”. In the section Psychology of 
Guess at the Riddle (Peirce, W 6:184) there is the first idea of evanescent feelings 
(recurrent also in the Law of Mind), and the idea of evolution as habit-forming 
is already formulated (Peirce, W6.190; W 6.208-209). In the same manuscript 
on “Design and Chance”, habit is defined as “the tendency to repeat any action 
which has been performed before” (Peirce, 1883-1884, W 4.553). Then, evolu-
tion is again considered as a process from chance to law (Peirce, W 6.199-202). 
I also note that the three basic elements of evolution (which later on were in 
fact integrated in biological evolution theory: Cfr. (Auletta, 2011a: Sec. 9.11)) 
are defined (Peirce, W 6.202): individual variation, elimination of unfavorable 
characters (i.e. selection). hereditary transmission, where it is likely not a chance 
that the second and the third steps are exchanged.
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1.3 Third period
The third period starts in 1891 with a series of papers published in The Mo-
nist. Here, the categories take a more decided evolutionary turn. In fact, already 
in a manuscript of 1890 (Peirce, 1890a, W 8.19-22) he introduces the triad 
chance-law-continuity as well as the canonical trichotomy first-second-third. In 
the first paper of the series, “The Architecture of Theories”, he stresses again that 
laws come from evolution out of chance (Peirce, W 8.101). This implies that 
laws (and “uniformity in general”) demand rational justification (see also (Peirce, 
1883-1884, W 4.547)). This can be true for laws, at least to a certain extent, 
however it is certainly not true for symmetries (which ground all kinds of unifor-
mities). In other words, current scientific developments show that not every kind 
of order is the result of evolution and not every kind of order demands rational 
justification. Here, Peirce, although a revolutionary thinker, is still influenced by 
the classical view of science that considers dynamical factors and causal explana-
tions as primary (in fact laws and causal explanations coincided in that frame-
work). Moreover, that approach conceives relations present in our real world as 
dynamical only, as it is evident by Einstein’s later contribution3.
As a consequence, in all of these papers the main idea is that habit-taking, 
first presented as characteristic of mental evolution (Peirce, W 8.105-106). is a 
primordial principle of the universe (Peirce, W 8.179): as Peirce says, it is a kind 
of “objective idealism” on the outline of Schelling: “matter is not completely 
dead, but it is merely mind hide-bound with habits” (Peirce, W 8.155), what 
to a certain extent could even be considered as an incongruence: if habit-form-
ing or habit-taking (depending on whether we stress the objective or subjective 
dimension) rules the evolution from chance to the mental dimension of ratio-
nality, how it is possible that “stupid” matter is a conglomerate of habits? Or at 
least, which additional reason makes that matter does not progress towards a 
mind-like dimension? Moreover, what appears astonishing is that Peirce vindi-
cates the Darwinian framework of evolution (in fact, the general mechanism of 
chance-selection-transmission, although again in bad order, is presented) but he 
correctly points out that evolution by habit-taking is Lamarckian and not Dar-
3 On this stuff see Auletta, & Wang (2014: c. 10). I shall come back to this problem in the next 
section.
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winian (Peirce, W 8.102; W 8.192-93) or also Schelling-like (Schelling is explic-
itly mentioned in Peirce (W 8.135). It is worth noticing that a similar problem 
emerges in the second paper (Peirce, 1892a) about the problem of ampliative in-
ferences (induction and abduction but also some forms of deduction). In fact, it 
is said (Peirce, W 8.114-15) that any inference of this kind “involves no postulate 
whatever” as far as it converges spontaneously towards truth. However, in the 
influential papers written in 1868-1869, and in particular in 1868c, he stressed 
that the progress of knowledge comes from error correction and therefore from 
the reformulation or even dropping of previous assumptions (Peirce, W 2.239). I 
am not sure that Peirce now considers this point to be still a heritage of his early 
nominalism from which he will now take the distance (Peirce, W 8.136), what I 
would find inexact. Likely not, since in a later contribution (Peirce, 1898: 165) 
he reaffirms the view that the progress of knowledge corrects previous premises, 
and so also previous assumptions. So, it is difficult to conceive knowledge and its 
progress without postulating something.
Coming back to his first paper of the series, he proposes also here the ca-
nonical triad (Peirce, W 8.109). What is interesting is that he affirms that the 
third is mediator between first and second but, as in the 1886 manuscript on 
“One, Two, Three”, adds that the future is such that “the world becomes an 
absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system” (Peirce, W 8.110), what, as 
mentioned, appears to be in conflict with the idea that Secondness be an issue 
of resistance and brute force. In other words, how to conceive Secondness as 
the world of brute facts if at the same time is the final realization of a rational 
order? Or we need to renounce the idea that Thirdness is a dynamical mediation 
between the other two categories bringing from Firstness to Secondness? I again 
remark that having conceived both Secondness and Thirdness as dynamical may 
have generated some inconsistencies.
In the paper on “The Law of Mind” (Peirce, 1892b; Peirce, 1893b) Peirce 
introduced two new evolutionary categories: tychism (chance) and synechism 
(continuity). the latter showing some connections with his early world of ab-
straction. Although the first concept agrees well with Firstness, for the reasons 
mentioned continuity does not fit with Secondness, nor with Thirdness: the 
problem of the first identification is due to the inner conflict in the category of 
Secondness, since, on the one hand he had previously spoken of Secondness be-
ing the rational destiny of the universe, which would fit with the notion of conti-
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nuity; but, on the other hand, he has always intended it as ruling the conflicts of 
the physical world. The problem with the identification between synechsim and 
Thirdness is that the former has an ideal or pure rational content, while the latter 
should possess a dynamical character. This is also the reason why, in those years, 
he tends to identify Law with Secondness (Pons, 2013: 111-13). He first presents 
continuity as connected with an associationist theory of the mind, according to 
which “ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others” by loos-
ing their intensity so that “the present is connected with the past by a series of 
infinitesimal steps” (Peirce, W 8.136-37). Then, according to the conception of 
evolution from Peirce, chance to law and rationality, Peirce says that feelings (the 
primary element of the mental life) “become welded together in association” so 
that “the result is a general idea” (Peirce, W 8.149; Peirce, 1898: 236-37). In this 
new dynamical view, time is considered in Aristotelian terms so that “the present 
is half past and half to come” (Peirce, W 8.146). and “the future is suggested by, 
or rather is influenced by the suggestions of, the past” (Peirce, W 8.150)4.
The third new notion, Agapism or agapasm, was introduced in the paper on 
Evolutionary Love (Peirce, 1893a). The justification for formulating this principle 
is the necessity to introduce a “propulsion” since “habit is mere inertia” (Peirce, 
W 8.192). Thus, agapistic evolution or evolution by love, in contrast with both 
evolution by chance and evolution by necessity, becomes the “energetic projacula-
tion” of the universe (Peirce, W 8.194). As a consequence, the “agapastic develop-
ment of thought” is “distinguished by its purposive character” (Peirce, W 8.203). 
In this context, I recall that he affirms that “it is the instincts, the sentiments, that 
make the substance of the soul. Cognition is only its surface, its locus of contact 
with what is external to it” (Peirce, 1898: 110). This seems, however, to go much 
further than the development of thought. In fact, elsewhere (Peirce, 1902, EP 
2.121-24) he affirms that ideas “have a power of finding or creating their vehicles, 
and having found them, of conferring upon them the ability to transform the face 
of the earth”. Here, it is evident that Peirce, who from here on identifies agapism 
with Secondness (due the notion of effort) and synechism with Thirdness (due to 
the dimension of rationality and legality). thinks about the dynamical character of 
the latter in terms of the influence that ideas can have on the world (it is a stron-
4 These are important ideas that I have shown to be also in agreement with more recent scientific 
developments (Auletta, 2011b: Subsec. 3.3.7).
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ger turn to the realism of ideas, on which I shall come back). In the interesting 
manuscript on Immortality in the Light of Synechism (Peirce, 1893b) he, quoting 
Parmenides’s dictum “being is, and not-being is nothing”, adds (Peirce, EP 2.2).
This sounds plausible; yet synechism flatly denies it, declaring that being is a 
matter of more or less, so as to merge insensibly into nothing. How this can be 
appears when we consider that to say that a thing is to say that in the upshot of 
intellectual progress it will attain a permanent status in the realm of ideas.
However, this has the momentous consequence of attributing to formal re-
alities like ideas a dynamical character, which need to be obviously of teleolog-
ical kind. It seems that Peirce has forgotten Leibniz’s lesson that Ideæ non agunt 
(Leibniz, 1678-1679: 150). The main problem of Peirce here is the same of the 
late-Middle Ages and Modern Aristotelism: the conflation of formal and final 
causes together (rooted in Aristotle’s biological model of causation). so that there 
are finally only dynamical causes, which paved the way to the modern identifi-
cation between the notion of efficient causation and that of causation in general 
(Pasnau, 2004; Auletta, 2011b: Subsecs. 3.2.5, 3.3.7). It may be not by chance 
that in the following Peirce avoid to use the notion of agapism, or at least I could 
not find consistent reference to it, although he often comes back to the notions 
of tychism and synechism. However, this would make the categories somehow 
incomplete, and this can be the reason why Peirce never abandoned the older 
notions of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness.
1.4 Fourth period
Of these developments his fourth period, covering the years just after The 
Monist’s series of papers, is witness. Apart from some unpublished manuscripts 
quoted in the Robin catalogue (e.g 13 and 954-55, part. published in (Peirce, CP 
1.141-175)) and very short fragments (Peirce, CP 1.300-303). I recall the short 
manuscript on “The Categories” (Peirce, 1893-1895). which is an examination 
of the three kinds of relations (proving that there are not of superior order) and 
of the canonical triad. Here, continuity is again associated with Thirdness. In his 
famous letter to W. James (Peirce, CP 8.249-315) he quotes both tychism and 
synechism although he deals again essentially with the first triad (see in particular 
8.264-8.269). I also recall that in another manuscript (Peirce, 1899) he treats 
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the canonical triad in terms of quality-reaction-form. Far more important is the 
series of the 1898 Cambridge Lectures (Reasoning and the Logic of Things). Also 
here it is said that “the really continuous things, Space, and Time, and Law, are 
eternal” (Peirce, 1898: 115), so that “the whole universe of true and real possi-
bilities forms a continuum, upon which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by 
virtue of the essential Secondness of Existence, a discontinuous mark” (Peirce, 
1898: 162; see also Peirce 1898: 189-190, where it is said that “continuity is 
Thirdness in its full entelechy”; 1898: 261). This distinction seems to me to be 
crucial: it is a pity that Peirce did not maintain it so clearly in his subsequent 
production. In fact, it is worth noticing that the dynamical view of the evolu-
tion from chance towards rationality become for Peirce the way in which nature 
syllogizes: in particular, “Nature also makes inductions and retroductions”, so 
that “Evolution wherever it takes place is one vast succession of generalizations” 
(Peirce, 1898: 161; 1898: 197-98). Precisely because of that distinction, I had 
preferred that Peirce had spoken here of analogues of inferential processes. Al-
though Peirce avoids here the term agapism he stresses that mental habits cannot 
be built without a certain effort (Peirce, 1898: 191). In these lectures there is also 
an important correction of previous views: here, it is in fact said that no random 
interactions among molecules could produce whatever effect without some kind 
of regularity (Peirce, 1898: 210-11). what shows that evolution cannot happen 
by chance alone: “uniformity, or necessary law, can only spring from another 
law; while fortuitous distribution can only spring from another fortuitous distri-
bution. Law begets law; and chance begets chance”. However, Peirce still affirms 
that “laws of nature are results of an evolutionary process” (Peirce, 1898: 240-
41)5. The notions of tychism and synechism are recalled (Peirce, 1898: 260-61) 
but there is no word in the whole book about agapism.
1.5 Fifth period
We can likely distinguish a fifth period covering the later production, starting 
in the years 1902-1903, where he became again very active on this issue in the oc-
5 I shall come back to this issue in the next section.
35Critical Examination of Peirce’s Theory of Categories
SCIO. Revista de Filosofía, n.º 12, Noviembre de 2016, 23-49, ISSN: 1887-9853
casion of two important series of lectures: this period is characterized by a stronger 
realism about categories, which brings him to distinguish between reality that can 
be attributed also to categories and existence, which is a prerogative of individuals 
(Pons, 2013: 119-25). In particular, I make reference here to the 1903 Harvard 
lectures. Here (Peirce, EP 2.149-53). the triad consisting in presentness, struggle, 
nous or intelligibility is presented. In the third lecture (“The Categories Defend-
ed”) he comes back to the canonical formulation recalling the connection with 
index-icon-symbol (Peirce, EP 2.160-64). and again stresses the third as medium. 
The same concepts are essentially discussed in the third (“The Seven Systems of 
Metaphysics”) and seventh (“Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction”) lecture. In 
the manuscript on “Sundry Logical Conceptions” (Peirce, 1903b). Thirdness is 
again understood as habit-forming. The issue of the final state of the universe as 
entelechy is expressed in the manuscript on “New Elements”, where it is said:
The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that 
Universe in its aspect as a sign, the ‘Truth’ of being. The ‘Truth’, the fact that is 
not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign (Peirce, 
1904, EP 2.304). 
The problem is that it seems to be there a confusion between habit-form-
ing, which according to previous views should be the proper mode or process 
of evolution, and its final state. If Thirdness becomes such a final state, how it 
can be the mediator of the whole process? In fact, Peirce himself had correctly 
distinguished between Aristotle’s notions of energheia (as a process or power) and 
entelechia (as final state) (Peirce, 1886b, W 5.404; 1906b, EP 2.373-74). In the 
same 1904 manuscript he says (EP 2.304-305):
Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former sets out from 
a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted, passing from this, as its mat-
ter, to successive interpretants embodying more and more fully its form, wishing 
ultimately to reach a direct perception of the entelechy; while the latter, setting 
out from a sign signifying a character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as 
its form, to successive interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter, 
hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct effort, producing the entelechy. But 
of these two movements, logic very properly prefers to take that of Theory as the 
primary one.
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The two aspects are clearly distinguished, and it seems to me to be obvious 
that the physical world (that is, our universe) follows the latter and not the for-
mer. It is remarkable that in the later manuscript on “The Basis of Pragmaticism 
in Phaneroscopy” (Peirce, 1906a: 364-65) he again comes back to the proof that 
there can be no relations of order higher than three that are not decomposable in 
relations of lower degree.
§2. CRITICAL EXAMINATION
2.1 Are there three ultimate categories?
The first problem to be examined is the issue of the nature and extent of 
Peirce’s theory of categories. Apart from juvenile drafts, it is evident that the 
first ripe manifestations of his thought (in the second half of the 1860s) have 
essentially two roots: logic and theory of experience, two problems that are not 
completely unrelated since they are doubly connected through the forms of in-
ference and semiotics. From a logical point of view, he correctly points out that 
relations are essentially of three orders: monadic, dyadic, triadic. I shall come 
back on the way in which these relations are understood. By now, let us assume 
Peirce’s definitions. Moreover, I consider Peirce’s arguments about the reduction 
of higher-order relations to a combinatory of these three as exhaustive. About the 
problem of experience, it is difficult to deny that we can cast all kinds of inter-
course with the world in three fundamental aspects or issues: feelings or primary 
(and in general first) experiences of things (and in particular of their qualitative 
manifestations). experiences of resistance, and experiences of acquaintance or 
habit-forming. This is evident when considering the way in which we get a new 
idea (in general a solution to a problem). then try to develop it against the intel-
lectual status quo of our time (which is by definition conservative, as expressed 
in academies and magazines) and eventually succeed in spreading it once that 
we have succeeded in showing its fertility. This is certainly an important contri-
bution to philosophy and we can say that Peirce has so far succeeded in taking 
elements coming from the idealistic tradition (essentially from Kant and Hegel). 
remoulding them and conferring to them a more precise and deeper status.
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However, as we know, Peirce’s understanding of categories goes much further, 
becoming the way for dealing with fundamental ontological and even meta-
physical questions. Peirce knew very well that the issue was lively discussed in 
ancient philosophy, especially by Aristotle and his commentators. The Greek 
philosopher asked whether there is a universal category of being and his answer 
was negative, reaching the conclusion that being is framed in several (canonically 
ten) categories or at least in a fourfold subdivision that Porphyry summarizes as 
follows:
If I had to give the minimal possible division into genera, I would divide oντα, 
and the significant φωναí corresponding to them, into four as follows: Beings are 
either substances (universal or particular) or accidents (universal or particular). 
Division, therefore, smaller than the fourfold is not possible6.
Moreover, as Evangeliou points out, according to Porphyry there is not a sin-
gle way to categorize the world. It is also important to consider this problem also 
in the context of current Category theory (Spivak, 2013). Accordingly, we can 
certainly build very general categories (like the category of all sets, denoted Set) 
or even the category of all categories (CAT). Nevertheless, these categories are 
articulated mathematical structures satisfying fundamental requisites: essentially, 
categories are collections of objects (in the general mathematical sense of the 
word) and of mapping among them called morphisms, which satisfy composi-
tionality, associativity and identity law. So, it is not easily understood in which 
sense generalizing categories will bring us to concepts that are simultaneously of 
general applicability and basic from the point of view of our experience of the 
world. There is in fact a crucial aspect of our experience of the world: as men-
tioned, Aristotle had pointed out that “substance” can be understood as both a 
category and an individual substance (Aristotle, 1986, Cat.: 3b10 and ff.). The 
latter is for him a primum datum (Evangeliou, 1997: 52-53) and represents by 
definition something that is not categorizable and Aristotle uses the term tode ti 
(Aristotle, 1988, Phys.: 185a31-32). Peirce knew very well this problem and had 
often quoted Duns Scot’s term haecceitas or thisness for saying the same (Peirce, 
1887-1888: 205). Moreover, it is evident that in his semiotic theory the aspect 
6 Quoted in Evangeliou (1997: 52).
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that he calls index stands precisely for a relation in which we establish a reference 
to something, i.e. a denotation, without a connotation. This is often brought in 
connection with Secondness. In other words, the ultimate and individual objects 
of our experience are not subject to categorization. If we like, it is another way to 
say the Kantian distinction between noumenon and phenomenon.
This problem has been brought to the attention of the scientific community 
when dealing with quantum-mechanical events. In fact, an event simply hap-
pens and this in a way that is not predictable. If we like to know more about 
this happening, paradigmatically a detection event, we need certain conditions 
through which the system that is detected becomes connected in such a way to 
an apparatus that we can infer something about the former and finally ascribe 
to it a property. Here, we are able to categorize. However, to categorize means 
precisely to establish a general class into which these and those things fall. In 
fact, a property is an equivalence class of different detection events (Auletta, & 
Wang, 2014: sec. 12.4). This short examination shows two important aspects: 
1. Whatever property we ascribe, this is not such a simple process as Peirce may 
have thought about primary qualities but is in fact rooted in complex interac-
tion between things (and also between ourselves and things). so that we cannot 
speak of a First in the context experience without a Second (and even a Third, 
what was also acknowledged by him, as mentioned); 2. The basic ontology of 
our world is resistant to categorization and can in fact be dealt with only in the 
context of experience. I fully accept Peirce’s criticism of Kant about the fact that 
reality is not such a passive and formless substrate that the German philosopher 
may have thought, since it is able to correct us. With his splendid words, “real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than 
the mind’s creation” (Peirce, CP 1.325); or also: “Where is the real, the thing 
independent of how we think it, to be found? There must be such a thing, for we 
find our opinions con- strained; there is something, therefore, which influences 
our thoughts, and is not created by them” (Peirce, 1871: 468; 1898: 170). Nev-
ertheless, whatever categorization we impose on the world does not and cannot 
catch its intimate happenings and processes bypassing the way in which we frame 
them in our categorial apparatus.
If, at the opposite, we follow the suggestion that Secondness is related to our 
way to denote things without connote them and Firstness (or iconicity) to our 
way to imagine things without denotative import (which are clearly two limiting 
39Critical Examination of Peirce’s Theory of Categories
SCIO. Revista de Filosofía, n.º 12, Noviembre de 2016, 23-49, ISSN: 1887-9853
cases). this is precisely the way to describe how we make experience and is so far 
fully correct. However, we cannot assume that we deal here with the metaphysi-
cal constitution of reality. In other words, I am suggesting that there is in Peirce’s 
work a potential conflict between the three categories understood as framing our 
experience (and as rooted in logic) and their understanding as the basic onto-
logical categories. I also remark that the incongruences that I have noted among 
different Peircean formulations are due precisely to the difficulty to have a uni-
vocal ontological definition of these presumed categories. I admit that many of 
Peirce’s expressions could be interpreted in one sense or the other. Nevertheless, 
I think that would greatly help the spreading and assimilation of his philosophy 
if we overcome any ambiguity on this point.
Nevertheless, we could frame the three categories in terms of heuristic princi-
ples (Auletta, 2011b: c. 3) dealing with very general aspects of our world: random 
events (of any kind at all level: physical, biological, mental). correlations (of any 
kind and again at any level). itinerant dynamics (i.e. dynamics of any kind able 
to produce novelty). Then, following Peirce’s core thinking, we could say that 
(1) a fundamental dimension of reality is represented by the spontaneity of hap-
penings grounding the irreducible variety of nature that we observe; (2) Nature 
displays the capability to exert constraints and to canalize phenomena giving rise 
to convergences at all levels of complexity; (3) Nature displays an itinerant dy-
namic interplay between happenings and constraints.
2.2 Different forms of relation
Peirce has well understood the distinction between correlations (Secondness) 
and triadic relations like somebody giving something to somebody else (Peirce, 
1903a: 170-71; 1903b: 272-73). However, he considers both kinds of relation in 
dynamical terms as far as he understands Secondness as clash and resistance and 
thirdness as process. As mentioned, this is a typical of the way in which classical 
thinkers conceive relations. In fact, the only kind of relation among things that 
classical physics acknowledged was causality and in particular mechanical or ef-
ficient causality (the two notions were considered synonym). It is therefore one 
of the most important merits of Peirce to have acknowledged that mechanical 
causality is not the only way through which things are connected. Nevertheless, 
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since he could not understand relations if not in dynamical terms, he finally 
acknowledged two kinds of relations (apart form the monadic ones) and of cau-
sality: mechanical (brute force) and final (ideal) connections.
It is remarkable that the classical way to consider the problem has still domi-
nated science up at least the half of the last century. In a famous paper published 
in 1935 by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, it is said that physical systems that do 
not exchange signals (and thus a fortiori are not dynamically connected) need to 
be considered as separated (no operation of any kind that we perform on one of 
them can have any kind of effect on the other).
However, the notion of correlation does not demand as such any dynamicity. 
Logically speaking, it only demands covariance. However, as Leibniz first un-
derstood, covariance can happen in fully absence of mechanical causal effects, 
although he interpreted this in terms of the pre-established harmony (Leibniz, 
1702; 1710-1712; 1712-1714). This revolutionary insight is again proved by 
later developments in quantum mechanics where the interdependency among 
quantum systems that is called entanglement is a bond without any exchange of 
signals. A classical (although imperfect) example is the following: if two different 
persons read the same newspaper in two different parts of the world, they share 
ipso facto some information (and become therefore correlated) although they 
have not met and likely will never meet.
It is true that sometimes Peirce speaks of Secondness in terms of “static force” 
and “constraint” (Peirce, CP 1.325). which is fully correct. He also says that the 
Second is like “like dead matter, whose existence consists in its inertia” (Peirce, 
1887-1888: 171). But he also writes: “When we think of Secondness, we nat-
urally think of two reacting objects, a first and a second” (Peirce, CP 1.526). If 
the term “reaction” is intended in the sense of inertia it is very good, but if it is 
intended in the sense of active resistance, it is not appropriate.
Thus, I suggest to introduce the basic distinction between formal (static) cor-
relations as expressed in covariance (and having the nature of ideal and formal 
realities) and dynamical relations which are ultimately interactions (ruling the 
way in which physical individuals meet). If Peirce had cast things in such a way, 
his theory of relations would have been much more effective. This brings us im-
mediately to the issue of causation, the next problem to consider.
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2.3 Different forms of causes
One of Peirce’s biggest insights is that a combination of formal or ideal struc-
tures with mechanical processes can produce teleonomic and teleological pro-
cesses, where with the former term I understand processes robust to the initial 
conditions and bringing to a final state without an explicit goal, while the latter 
with goal (Auletta, 2011a: c. 8; 2011b: subsec. 3.3.1). This is precisely what we 
observe in organisms especially when considered in their ecological context. In 
fact, teleological aspects require agents like organisms, while primitive forms of 
teleonomic processes can also be found at a prebiotic level especially when com-
plexity is involved. However, the formal or rational part is not what sets the pro-
cess in motion. Whatever formal structures are in fact inert. They do nothing per 
se, as mentioned. Only efficient or mechanical causes have the power to produce 
effects. This is also acknowledged by Peirce when he says that cognition alone 
brings to nothing without effort of some kind. Moreover, he speaks of mechanical 
causes as “the court-sheriff, the arm of the law” (Peirce, 1902, EP 2.121), without 
which the law would be ineffective. Nevertheless, once activated by mechanical 
causes, formal causes causally contribute to certain effects that otherwise, in their 
absence, would not have arisen. In being activated they are pull out from the 
heaven of ideas to be integrated in the physical world and become in this way true 
causes. As forms in themselves, they are correlations among possibilities and as 
such, as Peirce clearly knows, they only have an ideal character.
However, this implies that we need to sharply distinguish between formal 
causes and final ones. Teleonomic or teleological processes can arise precisely 
through an apt combination of mechanical and formal causes. It is true that in 
fact, in most situations, these two aspects are intertwined, so that Peirce’s view is 
in a sense understandable. However, they need to be conceptually distinguished, 
and to say that this process is determined in advance by some kind of finality is 
to put things upside down (Auletta, 2015). In fact, the crucial notion of hab-
it-forming should precisely set things in the correct way by establishing teleology 
as something arising (in the course of evolutionary processes) from, so to say, 
below and not pre-ordered from above. However, if habit-forming is understood 
as the law of all laws and as the quintessence of rationality, we risk, as noted, to 
mix the process and the result. Thus, if we correctly understand at least one of 
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Peirce’s main intentions, Secondness is the mechanical part setting the process in 
motion, while Thirdness is habit-forming as way to spontaneously generalize (to 
perform the analogous of inferences). that is to cross these mechanical processes 
with rational requirements, where the dynamism is only in the former.
However, where is the place of these rational requirements themselves? They 
should be neither Secondness, nor Thirdness, and I am not sure that they can 
be framed at all in Peirce’s canonical theory of categorization due to the fact 
that they also fail to be Firstness, even though, as seen, he speaks sometimes of 
the feeling of qualities as kinds of abstractions: “a fact is an abstracted element 
of” the “objective history of the universe” (Peirce, 1898: 198). In whatever way 
things stand, this could explain the whole trouble with synechism, which Peirce 
correctly connects with the ideal or rational dimension. In other words, I am not 
sure that Peirce’s theory of categories is really helpful for dealing with the issue 
of the different forms of causes, although many of his insights are crucial for 
throwing light on this problem.
2.4 Habit-forming
Peirce lived long before crucial scientific developments of the 20th century, 
although he had anticipated some of them, as already mentioned. In particular, 
he did not have at his disposal a so powerful tool as information theory. Infor-
mation is so general that it also applies to basic physical systems like the quan-
tum-mechanical ones (D’Ariano et al., 2016). In this very basic understanding 
of information, no meaning or reference is necessary. At the opposite, if we try 
to apply the notion of sign (which necessarily demands reference) to the physical 
world, we undergo some incongruence. I am obviously not denying the validity 
of Peirce’s semiotics. This is one of his most important contributions. What I am 
saying is that semiotics describes very well the way in which organisms (include 
humans, at least as far as we consider their biological constitution) deal with 
the world but is not the general way in which information is exchanged in our 
universe (Auletta, 2016).
It is not by chance that Peirce resorted to a kind of panpsychism, applying 
the mental law of habit-forming to the evolution of our universe. I have already 
observed that this is rather a kind of Lamarckian evolution than a Darwinian 
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one. This is quite amazing, since Peirce had understood the general characters 
of evolution and had stressed the importance of selection processes. However, as 
mentioned, he had inverted the selection step and the transmission step. Now, 
if we say that, after the production of some variation, we have first selection 
of some of this variants and then transmission of their “characters” to the next 
generations, we have a random result of the selection and this is the Darwinian 
model of evolution. If we say, at the opposite, that first there is transmission 
and subsequently elimination of what does not fit, we have a process in which 
selection gives no longer rise to a random result but is purposive in the sense of 
Lamarckian evolution.
Now, there is no doubt that a fundamental process of the mind is association 
and therefore habit-forming. However, association is not the only mental pro-
cess and factor. Although crucial, especially for what memory concerns, other 
processes, like reasoning, require the application of rules that cannot be derived 
through association. It is here a situation that is the mental counterpart of what 
I have said about symmetries in the physical world. It is quite amazing Peirce’s 
stress on associationism in this context as the unique explanation of mental 
processes when, in his more technical papers and manuscripts on logic (Peirce, 
1868a, W II.23-24; 1868a, W 4.164-65; 1881). he was well aware that infer-
ences require the rule of modus ponens or a leading principle (“if propositions of 
certain description are true, then a proposition related to them in a certain way 
will also always be true”) that, when is maximally abstract, is called logical prin-
ciple (Peirce, 1898: 131-32). So, as I have mentioned, it is impossible to conceive 
knowledge and its progress without principles or rules even provisionally postu-
lated. Moreover, association is not purposive. And even when there are clearly 
purposive elements, like in learning, it is disputable that the Lamarckian model 
is the correct account of these processes. In fact, learning is the process through 
which we throw out possible solutions by keeping a subset of them (Auletta, 
2011a: c. 14 & 16). Note that this process is endogenous and the teacher does 
nothing more than giving an appropriate sensory stimulus for setting this process 
in motion. Only thereafter there is assimilation and consolidation, fine-tuning, 
of the results, which are certainly processes in which association plays an im-
portant role. Thus, also here selection comes first (after production of variants). 
what shows that also purposive mental processes are ruled by basic Darwinian 
mechanisms. Moreover, the purposive character of learning is only due to the 
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complexity of the human mind and of the processes involved here. And this is 
precisely the aspect that cannot be transferred to the physical world.
The reason why selection comes first is due to this circumstance (Auletta, 
2011a: secs. 3.2 and 14.1): any selection, independently from its specific mech-
anisms, which can be very various, needs to be a “choice” among alternative 
possibilities or possible events. Now, such a selection needs necessarily to be not 
determined by other factors otherwise it would not be a choice at all but a result 
determined by certain (univocal) initial conditions. In other words, its result 
need to be random. Although in complex mental process we try to reduce these 
random aspects by setting additional conditions that limits its range, it can never 
be eliminated by any kind of selection or choice, even those that are in fact pur-
posive like true choices.
Thus, we see again that evolution in all domains is a bottom-up process in 
which there is no finality involved if not in the consequences of this evolutionary 
process itself. In fact, both necessity and finality are in general in the consequenc-
es and not in the antecedents of whatever evolutionary process (Auletta, 2011b: 
subsec. 3.3.1). Thus, habit-forming, especially in its Lamarckian formulation, 
cannot be taken as the sole paradigm of any evolution occurring in our universe, 
although it remains true that repetition of certain behaviours determines the es-
tablishment of certain regularities (Auletta, 2011a: secs. 4.1, 12.7, and c. 15-16). 
Again, I think that Peirce insight was great but formulated in an imperfect and 
incomplete way. This is especially clear when examining the problem of laws.
2.5 Evolution of laws
One of the biggest insights of Peirce is that natural constants and therefore 
also laws may be evolved with time. This is again a true revolutionary insight. 
However, it seems that model of habit-forming misled Peirce. In fact, as seen, he 
assumed that there can be evolution from a state of almost pure chance towards 
a final state of almost pure law and rationality. However, the inference from the 
possible evolution of laws to this conclusion is not allowed if not by further as-
suming that the law of all laws is habit-forming and that habit-forming sponta-
neously leads to rationality. However, we have also seen that Peirce acknowledges 
that no regularity can come out of random processes if not thanks to some other 
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regularity. So, there is no reason to suppose that the initial state of the universe 
was a pure lawless condition. In fact, everybody now thinks that the laws of 
quantum mechanics need to be assumed before anything about the arising of 
our universe can be said. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that the final 
stage of the universe will be fully rational. It is true that we humans on the Earth 
have accommodated the environment to our rational plans, and we can imagine 
a humanity that will live millions of years and reach such a level of evolution 
to be able to influence cosmic processes. So, to a certain extent Peirce was right 
and likely prophetic. However, as again quantum mechanics shows, there are 
irreducible random events in themselves, and these are likely at the source of 
many others, like genetic mutations or aging processes. There is no conceivable 
world in which this random aspect could disappear: if so, would be a dead or 
at least unfertile universe, since, according to Peirce himself, no novelty could 
be produced. In fact, Peirce understands variability as an irreducible principle 
or character of our universe. Thus, at most, and again I hope to catch Peirce’s 
essential way to think, we can say that the strength of reason is in its capability to 
integrate also what is not rational and not to eliminate it. It is not by chance that 
Peirce recalls us that Firstness only deals with the general aspects of randomness 
without presuming to account for random events themselves.
2.6 Representationalism
I have mentioned that Peirce’s semiotic theory is sometimes formulated in rep-
resentational terms. This is not necessary. The trouble is that any representation is 
the result of mental or neural processes that are intrinsic to each individual (and 
even to specimens of other species) and therefore cannot be shared as such. This is 
also acknowledged by Peirce when dealing with the iconic side of semiotics. Now, 
according to its pragmatistic epistemology the concept of a thing is the way in 
which it has effects on other things, which is rather connected with the indexical 
side of semiotics. In fact, concepts are certainly connected with representations 
but have also a different nature and can indeed be operational. It seems that Peirce 
did not make of this epistemology also an ontology. Concepts are in fact theo-
retical models of the way in which we have access to things and it is natural to 
presume that also things interact in this way making different aspects or characters 
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manifest that we catch by attributing to them properties. Thus we cannot make 
use of our categories for representing things “in themselves”, but we can presume 
that they interact (and correlate) in ways that are not very different from the way 
in which ourselves interact (and correlate) with them: recalling the case of detec-
tion, I have indeed stressed that the way in which we interact with things is also 
primary for the categories themselves. In fact, knowledge can be considered as a 
particular case of the general communication of our universe (and this communi-
cation, as mentioned, is governed by the rules of information exchange). I think 
that this is a true Peircean insight. In fact, Peirce went very near to this view when 
e.g. he wrote that “a thing may be said to be wherever it acts” (Peirce, 1890b, W 
8.78).
§3. CONCLUSIONS
Peirce says that philosophy is at its beginning and that it is in an infantile 
condition (Peirce, 1898: 107). As mentioned, his project was to establish robust 
foundations of philosophy, especially of logical kind, in order to make of this 
discipline a field comparable with natural sciences. With this I am not meaning 
that philosophy need to imitate the methods of empirical sciences but rather 
that it should show the same ability to consistently progress across time with a 
common tradition universally acknowledged. I think that Peirce gave an enor-
mous contribution in this sense and therefore his work represents an important 
departure point especially when integrated with the work of some philosophers, 
most of which were already reference points of the father of pragmatism: I recall 
here, among others, Plato, for his view that ideas have an objective reality and 
that the process of knowledge is endogenous, and Aristotle, for his doctrine of 
individuals constituting primary ontology and his explanation of the process of 
knowledge starting from the stimulus of experience; Aquinas and Duns Scot, 
especially concerning the integration of the views of the two Greek philosophers; 
Locke and Hume as the fathers of associationism; Leibniz and Kant for their 
theory of relations and the stress on the logical-constructive nature of the mind. 
In particular, I think that the departure from his early nominalism has some-
times brought Peirce to underestimate the dimension of individual facts and 
interactions, which for Aristotle represented the primary ontology. It is here that 
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a development of the Middle-Age integration of these views, together with the 
mentioned contributions of modern philosophers, can be very helpful. More-
over, we need to integrate his work with the subsequent scientific developments. 
This is again in the spirit of Peirce’s research, since he considered the fact that 
philosophy “has come to be set off from the other sciences” an “unfortunate ac-
cident” of his time (Peirce, 1898: 117).
The worst thing that we can do with Peirce’s work is to take his thought lit-
erally and to write on that commentaries on commentaries in order to account 
and “flatten” some incongruences. At the opposite, his philosophy demands to 
be used and put at work, and the only way to do that consistently is precisely to 
integrate this immense intellectual effort with both the previous philosophical 
tradition and the subsequent scientific developments.
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